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THE APPROPRIATION OF PAYMENTS.'
In this paper we propose to institute some inquiry as to the application of -the maxims- Quicquid solvitur, solvitur in modum soZventis8-Quicquid recipitur, recipitur in modum recipientis. By
way of introduction to our subject, let us, then, investigate gene-rally the nature of a payment.
".Payment" denotes the specific performance of an obligation to
give a sum of money to another. He to whom the money is owing
is called creditor; he from whom it is due, debtor; and the sum
itself, debt. The word debt is also used to denote sometimes the
debtor's obligation, and sometimes the correlative right of the
creditor. According to the above definition, payment presupposes
not only a sum of money due, but a sum of money which is either
ascertained in amount, or at least capable of being ascertained by
a mere arithmetical process. It is obvious that an obligation to
pay an unascertained sum' cannot be specifically performed at all;
until the amount of the money owing be definitely fixed, an obligation to pay cannot be determined by performance, 2 although it may
I From the London Law Magazine for August 1855, p. 21.
7 However, when the sum is ascertained, it may be treated as if it had previously
been so.
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be extinguished by release, or by accord and satisfaction, or in
some other way. Again, where there is no obligation there can be
no payment, but only a gift, loan, &c.1 Where a right to a sum of
money is determined otherwise than by the actual receipt of that
sum, there is likewise no payment, in the proper sense of the word.
The right may be extinguished in a mode more or less similar to payment, as by accord and satisfaction, where something other than
the sum due is accepted in satisfaction of the right to that sum;
or by set-off, where the right to a sum of money is extinguished
wholly or partially by an obligation to pay another sum of money
to the person from whom the first is due ; but these modes of extinguishing a right depend upon principles, and are governed by rules
materially different from those applicable to payment.
With reference to the subject-matter of the present inquiry, it
may be useful, although scarcely necessary, to remind the reader
that the position of a creditor is not, juridically speaking, altered
by a refusal to accept in satisfaction of his right, something other
than that which is due to him, whilst his position is most na~erial]y
altered by a refusal to accept payment. Such a refusal is, inpoint
of fact, a refusal to allow the debtor to free himself from an obligation by that which, ex hypothesi, is'a due performance of it.
Refusal to accept a partial payment (sometimes called a payment
on account,) is, however, obviously very different from a refusal to
accept complete payment, and is by no means attended by the same
consequences. It is important to remember this. A creditor who
has a right to a sum of 1,0001. is not, juridically speaking, prejudiced by a refusal to accept 501. at one time, 1001. at another, and
the residue at another. The creditor is under no obligation to allow
his claim to be satisfied piecemeal, as may best suit the convenience
of his debtor, and ought not to be and is not prejudiced by refusing
so to do.2 If, however, he does accept a partial payment, his claim
is of course extinguished pro tanto. Payment, moreover, only presupposes an obligation on the part of the debtor ; set-off, on the
I A person who pre-pays is never indebted (Smith vs. Winter, 21 L. J. C. P. 138);
he anticipates his obligation.
2 See Domat, Lois Civiles iv., tit. 1,

1, No. 16; and

4, No. 1.

THE APPROPRIATION OF PAYIENTS.

707

other hand, presupposes also a counter obligation of like nature on
the part of the creditor. Payment is the direct liquidation of a
debt due, or treated as due, at the time the payment is made ;
whilst set-off is the indirect liquidation of a debt by a counter-debt
previously or subsequently contracted. Set-off never requires to
be more carefully distinguished from payment than when the doctrines relating to the appropriation of payments have to be considered; and especially is it important to bear in mind that payment never creates an obligation, whilst that which gives rise to
right to set-off always does.
A payment is said to be "appropriated," or, as continental
writers say, "imputed," when the obligation of which it is a performance is finally ascertained and settled. If A owes B 1001.,
and no more, and pays B 1001., there is no room for doubt-the
payment is evidently appropriated as soon as it is made, and the
debt is extinguished. The only question which in such a case can
arise, is, whether the 1001. given by A to B, was a payment, or
something else,-e. g. a gift or a loan: supposing it to be a payment (and the presumption is that way') there can be no question
as to what debt it extinguished. But if A owed B several sums of
1001., and made a payment insufficient to liquidate them all, the
question would arise, which debt is to be deemed extinguished ? and
this question is often one of considerable difficulty and importance,
as will be obvious by supposing one of the debts to be barred by
time, or to be secured, whilst another is unsecured. It is that
branch of jurisprudence which determines the mutual rights of
debtor and creditor in such cases that we propose to examine.
Those cases2 in which a person has money in his hands to distribute amongst several claimants, of whom perhaps be is one, do not
fall within our province as above determined, although in their dis_
cussion the word appropriate is often made use of. They are
referred to here, to be excluded hereafter; for if confusion is to be
I1

Tay. Ev. 118; Best on Pres. 176.

2 Like Williams vs. Everett, 14 East, 582; Kilsby vs. Williams, 5 B. & A., 815.

Greenwood vs. Taylor, 14 Sim. 505; which are not cases of payment at all. They
belong to that branch of jurisprudence which determines the priority of conflicting
rights; or, as German writers say, the concurrence of rights.
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avoided, and precision to be attained, the subject for investigation
must be clearly defined and limited, and must not be departed from
and made to include matters which would never have been thought
ognate, had it not been for a verbal ambiguity.
.1 We proceed now to examine the mutual rights of debtor- and
creditor when a payment is about to be or has been made in respect
of debts due from the former to the latter.
I.-In the first place, then, let u8 inquire a-to the Bight of the
Debtor.
When a person is indebted to another on various accounts, the
'former has the option of paying which he likes first, and is at
-liberty to appropriate any payment he may make to whichever of
,thae debts he chooses. This doctrine is evidently derived from the
-Roman law. Ulpian says: " Quotie8 quis debitor ex pluribue

vausms unum deUitum 8olvit, est in arbitrio solventii, quodpotius
• ebtum votuerit 8olutum; et quod dixerit, id erit solutum."' This
vtle will be found laid down and acted upon in the cases cited, here-ifter, and was firmly established in the reign of Elizabeth, as appears
-rom Anon. Cro. El. 68, where it was held that, in spoite of the
'eeditor,*a debtor was entitled to have a payment made by him
%ppropriated to the account upon which he expressly made it.2 The
reason for this rule is variously given: Ulpian says :--Possumus
vnim certain legem dicere ei quod solvimu." Other writers refer
it to the fact that the money actually transferred belongs to the
debtor, who can part with what is his own on his own terms, or not
tit all. It has already been observed, that were the rule otherwise,
the law would lend its assistance to the prevention, on the part of
ithe creditor, of the due performance of the obligation to which the
'debtor is subject; and this is, perhaps, as satisfactory a reason as
Vny.
The rule in question is not, however, one -which obtains under all
circumstances and at all times: for, -first, it does not necessarily
apply unless the payment is sufficient completely to extinguish the
Dig. xlvi. tit. 8, deSolut. 1. 1.
See, tbo, Bois vs. Cranfield, Style, 239; Chase vs. Box, Freem. 261.
z Dig. ubi sup.
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debt on account of which it is made; and, secondly, it applies only
where the debtor appropriates the payment at the time he makes
it. These limitations of the rule require further development.
1. A creditor is not prejudiced by refusing to accept , partial
payment on account of a larger sum due.' If, therefore, he does
not choose to accept a partial payment on the account upon which
the debtor desires to make it, the creditor is in a position either to
decline altogether to take the money, or to insist, if he takes it,
upon applying it to the account which best suits himself. If a
partial payment is accepted without objection, the inference naturally is that the creditor agrees to apply it to the account to which
it was expressly or impliedly appropriated by the debtor, and the
money must be treated as appropriated accordingly. But if at the
time a partial payment is made, the creditor refuses to accept it
unless he is allowed to appropriate it to some particular account,
the inference, if the money is left with him, is, that the debtor
agreed that the money should be appropriated in accordance with
the declared will of the creditor. The rule, therefore, so broadly
laid down, Quidguid zRolvitur, solvitur in modum solventi, applies
only, 1. Where the sum paid equals all that is due on the account
on which it is paid; or, 2. Where the sum paidc (being less than all
that is due on the account on which it is paid) is receied by the
creditor without objection. In other cases the rule which applies
is Quidguid recipitur, recipiturin modum recipientis.'
2. By the law of this country the period within which a debtor
can exercise his right of appropriation is very limited; so limited,
that unless exercised at the time of payment his right to appropriate is gone forever. The debtor is not indeed called upon to
state expressly upon what account he makes the payment; that
may sufficiently appear from other circumstances. But, notwithstanding an opinion to the contrary, reported to have been expressed
by Lord Kenyon at Nisi Prius,-' the law appears to be clearly
settled that the right of the debtor to appropriate a payment must
I Dixon vs. Clark, 5 C. B. 365.
2 See the judgment in Webb vs. Weatherly, 1 Bing. N. C. 505; and Muhlenbrucl

Lehrb. des Pand. R.

470.

3

Hammersley vs. Knowlys, 2 Esp. 666.
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be exercised, if at all, at the time the payment is made, and not
afterwards. 1
This rule may be thought extremely harsh, but it must not be
forgotten that in the generality of cases payments on account are
not equal to what is owing on any account in particular, and that
therefore it more commonly occurs than not that the debtor has no
right at any time to insist on an appropriation to which his -creditor
would not assent. In the majority of cases a contrary rule would
be extremely prejudicial to the creditor, as it would deprive him of
the opportunity of objecting at the fitting time to receive a payment on the account desired by the debtor. And with regard to
payments which are not partial, when it is considered that payment
of a sum exactly equal to what is due on any particular account
goes far to show an appropriation by the debtor to that account, the
tule will by no means be found to be so harsh upon the debtor as
at first might be supposed. Whether, however, the rule be thought
justifiable or not, the cases already cited and those which will be
presently referred to, show that it is acted upon with great strictness by English judges.
H. We will in the rext place speak of the Right of the Creditor.
If the debtor when he makes a payment does not appropriate it to
any debt in particular, the laws of England2 and of most countries,
agree in conferring a right of appropriation upon the creditor.
The extent of this right as well as the time at which it must be
exercised, require to be examined.
1. As regards the time at which the creditor can exercise his
right, the Roman law' expressly declares that he must make the
appropriation at the time of payment: Permittitur ergo creditor
. sed con8tituere in re
constituere, in quod velit solutum, .
pre8enti, hoc est 8tatim atgue 8olutum est. This rule, however,
I

Manning vs. Westerne, 2 Vern. 606; Wilkinson vs. Sterne, 9 -Mod. 427 ; Bowes

vs. Lucas, Andr. 65; Hall vs. Wood, 14 East, 243, note c; Peters vs. Anderson, 5
Taunt. 696; Mayfield vs. Wadsley, 3 B. & C..357.
t See Manning vs. Westerne, 2 Vern. 607; Hall vs. Wood, 14 East, 243, note c;
Peters is. Anderson, 5 Taunt. 596 ; Campbell vs. Hodgson, Gow. 74.
• Dig. xlvi: tit. 3, 1. 1.
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does not prevail in this country.' In the well known case of Peters
vs. Anderson, (5 Taunt. 596,) the creditor was held to have appropriated a gen.-ral payment by the mode in which he framed his
action. In Sinson vs. IngLam, (2 B. & C. 65,) Best, J., thought
the creditor had only a reasonable time ; but in the latter case of
Philpott vs. Jones, (2 A. & E. 41,) it was expressly decided by Lord
Denman and the other judges of the Court of Queen's Bench, that
the appropriation of a general payment might be made by the
creditor at any time, at least at any time before action. This decision has been approved by the Court of Common Pleas.' Moreover, no appropriation by the creditor is binding until communicated
to the debtor ;3 and, therefore, until such communication has been
made, a creditor can change his mind as often as he likes. Simson
vs. Inglam, (2 B. & C. 65,) is the leading authority for this
doctrine, ard has never been doubted.'
Upon the whole, therefore, we conclude that a creditor can exercise his right of appropriation at any time he pleases, but that when
once he has, by bringing an action or otherwise, notified to his
debtor what appropriation has been made, no different appropriation
is allowable.
2. As regards the debt to which the creditor can appropriate a
general payment, the Roman law lays down as its fundamental
principle, tlat the creditor must act towards his debtor as he would
have the debtor act towards him, if their relative position were
reversed ;'"and it is only in cases of comparative indifference to the
debtor that the creditor is allowed to make such appropriation as he
pleases : Quoties vero non dicimus id, quod solutum sit, in arbitrio
est accipientis, cui potius debito acceptum ferat, dummodo in id
constituat solutum, in quod ipse, si deberet, esset soluturus, quoque
.quissimum
debito se exoneraturus esset, si deberet ..........
enin visurn est ereditoremn ita agere ren debitoris, ut suam ageret.
To what extent this rule was carried is not clear ; it could, howQumre if it ever did? See the dictum of Tindal, C. J., in Smith vs. Wigler, 3
Moore & Sc. 175.
2 Mills vs. Fowkes, 5 Bing. N. C. 4-55.
3 Simson vs. Ingham, 2 B. & C. 65.
4 See, too, Grigg vs. Cocks, 4 Sim..438; exparte Johnson, 3 Lc G. Mc. & G. 218.
6 Dig. xliv. tit. 3, de Solut. 1. 1.
5 Domat iv. 4, 2.
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ever, only apply where a payment was attempted to be appropriated
by the creditor, adversely to the interest of his debtor, and without
his knowledge. The rule could not apply if the appropriation were
attempted to be made in spite of the wish of the debtor, for, as we
have seen, he had the option of making such appropriation as he
liked, and the creditor's right could only be exercised statim atque
solutum est; nor could the rule apply if the debtor, knowing of the
appropriation, were silent, for silence under such circumstances,
would be deemed consent.
According to the law of our own country, a creditor is by no
means bound to make such an appropriation as best suits the convenience of his debtor. The debtor Can take care of himself by
stating in liquidation of what debt he makes a particular payment;
And if he does not either expressly or impliedy exercise this right,
the creditor can appropriate a payment to the discharge of whatever debt he pleases;' provided, of course, it be owing from the
person by or on whose behalf the payment is made. To such an
extent is this allowable, that a debt, payment of which cannot be
actively enforced, may be liquidated by a creditor in preference to
a debt which the creditor could by action be compelled to pay.
Thus, if one of two debts be barred by the Statute of Limitations,
the creditor is at liberty to appropriate a general payment in liquidation of the barred debt.2 Moreover, the debts need not be of an
equally high nature; whether they are or not is wholly immaterial.
In Peters vs. Anderson, 5 Taunt. 596, and Ohitty vs. Naish, 2
Dow. 511, the creditor was allowed to appropriate a general payment to a simple contract debt in preference to a specialty debt,3
and as, in both instances, the specialty was the older of the two
debts, the same cases are authorities to show that the creditor's
I See, in addition to the cases presently referred to, Campbell vs. Hodgson, Gow,
74; Morgan v8. Jones, 1 Bro. P. C. 32.
2 Mills vs. Fowkes, 5 Bing. N. C. 455; Williams vs. Griffiths, 5 M. & W. 300;
Nash vs. Hodgson, Kay, 650.

Such an appropriation cannot, however, be deemed
an admission by the debtor that the barred debt is due, and consequently does not
take the debt out of the statute. See, too, the caze of Philpott vs. Jones, 2 A. &
E. 41, andpost.
3 See, too, Chase vs. Cox, Freem. 261; Brazier vs. Bryant, 2 DowL 477, contra
Vin. Ab. Paym. M. 9.
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right of appropriation is independent of the relative ages of his
demands.'
The creditor's right prevails even as against a surety: for if a
person has two demands against the same debtor, and one of them
is secured by a surety, a payment made generally by the principal
debtor may be applied by the creditor to the liquidation of the other
demand, 2 for which the surety is not liable; and, consequently, the
surety may then be sued for the whole of the debt for which he is
responsible, less, of course, the excess, if any, of the sum paid,
over and above the debt to which the payment has been applied by
the creditor. The surety cannot effectually urge that the debtor
must be presumed to have performed his obligation to him by paying
off the guaranteed debt rather than some other.3
In conformity with the rule of the civil law, it was indeed held,
in an old case (Heyward vs. Lomax, 1 Vern. 23,) that a creditor
could not appropriate a general payment to the discharge of a debt
not bearing interest in preference to a debt on which interest was
running, "b~cause it is natural to suppose that a man would rather
elect to pay off the money for which interest was to be paid, than
the money due on account for which no interest is payable." Notwithstanding this natural supposition, the cases already referred to
show conclusively, that the creditor is not called upon to consult his
debtor's interest. Heyward vs. Lomax, moreover, is directly
opposed to what was held by the Lord Keeper in Chase vs. Box,
(Freem. 261,)' and is in principle also opposed to all the modern
cases, in which the creditor's right to appropriate has been upheld.
In Wentworth vs. Manning, 2 Eq. Ab. 261, this proposition appears not to have
been admitted.
2
zparte Whitworth, 2 Mont. Deac. & De G. 164; Kirby vs. Duke of Marlborough,
2 M. & S. 18; Plomer vs. Long, 1 Stark. 155; Perris vs. Roberts, 1 Vern. 34; and
Marryatts vs. White, 2 Stark. N. P. 101, are not opposed to this. Nor is Parr vs.
Howlin, 1 Ale. & Nap. 196.
3 In exp rte Whitworth, 2 Mont. Deac. & De G. 164, Sir J. Cross seems to have
thought that the doctrines of appropriation applied only as between the debtor and
creditor; and that when the interests of other persons were concerneOl, different
principles ought to be resorted to. This view has not, however, been taken by other
judges.
4 See, too, Manning vs. Westerne, 2 Vern. 606.
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The case of JHeyward vs. Lomax, it is therefore submitted, cannot
now be considered as law.
Having thus stated and illustrated the general principle according to which the creditor can make such an appropriation of a
general payment as best suits his own convenience, it is necessary to examine the real and apparent exceptions to the rule.
First.-The rule presupposes that the debtor has not himself
appropriated the payment.' Those cases, therefore, where an actual
appropriation by him is presumed or inferred, and whee, consequently, a different appropriation by the creditor cannot be allowed,
are excluded from the operation of the rule, but are not, properly
speaking, exceptions to it. Instances of presumed appropriation
are afforded by the cases of lleggot vs. Wilson, 1 Lord Raym.
286, and .Dawe vs. Holdsworth, Peake, N. P. ca. 64, where Lord
Holt, and Lord Kenyon on his authority, held that if two debts are
owing by a person, and he could be made bankrupt in respect of one
of them, but not in respect of the other, a payment made by him
generally is to be deemed to-have been made in liquidation of the
foriner, and not of the latter debt. By this, all that is meant
appears to be, that there is a presumption of appropriation by the
debtor, and that such presumption is not rebutted 'by proof that
there was not, in fact, any express appropriation. It must be
remembered that in Lord Holt's time, bankruptcy was regarded as
little short of a crime, and the presumption alluded to was a presumption in favor of innocence.'
The cases of Meggot vs. Mills, .Heyward vs. Lomax, and some
others, certainly show that our judges were formerly much more
inclined than now, to protect the debtor from a prejudicial appropriation by his creditor. The lenient doctrine of the civil law was
evidently'that tacitly adopted in the early stages of our commercial
law; but it has as evidently long been disregarded.
Instances where a payment made generally may nevertheless be
inferred to have been made on some particular account, and so, in
In cases not falling within the classes next noticed in the text, an intention on
'the part of the debtor to appropriate his payment, goes for nothing if it is not communicated to the creditor; Manning vs. Westerne, 2 Vern. 605.
2 See the observations of the Court on these two cases, in 5 Taunt. 602.
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fact, to have been appropriated by the debtor, may easily. be
imagined; many such cases are to be found in the books,' and from
them several secondary rules of considerable importance may be
deduced. These rules, however, being founded on inference, are
inapplicable where the inference on which they are based is excluded
by surrounding circumstances. Moreover, each case turning on its
own peculiar facts, it is impossible, after forming groups of cases,
to abstract any characters common to all the groups, except these,
viz : absence of express appropriation by the debtor, and presence
of circumstances which nevertheless justify an inference of appropriation by him. Premising that the cases ah:eady referred to show
conclusively that from the mere fact that appropriation in one way
would be most to the advantage of the debtor, no dppropriation in
that way is inferred to have been made by him, we proceed to
examine those cases in which appropriation by the debtor, has been
inferred.
1. One of the earliest rules laid down was, that where a principal
sum is due, and interest upon it is in arrear, a general payment is
to be deemed to have been made in liquidation of the arrears of
interest, and not uf the principal.2 As compound interest was not
allowed, this inference was evidently to the disadvantage of the
debtor. The rule, however, is reasonable, inasmuch as no creditor
would think of accepting a sum in part-payment of a principal,
until the interest upon it had been liquidated.
2. When the money received by the creditor arises from the sale
of a security given for a particular debt, the money is ordinarily to
be treated as a payment on account of the same debt.s
3. When money is handed over by a debtor to his creditor, such
money is inferred to be a payment on account of then existing liquidated debts, and not to be a deposit to secure future debts; and
the creditor is not therefore allowed to appropriate such money
I See, in addition to the cases cited hereafter, Shaw vs. Picton, 4 B. & C. 715;
Perris vs. Roberts, 2 Vern. 34; Marryatts vs. White, 2 Stark. N. P. 101.
2 Vin. Ab. Paym. M. 4; Haynes vs. Harrison, 1 Ch. Ca. 105: Chase vs. Box,
Freem. 261 ; Bostock vs. Bostock. 8 Mod. 242: Bower vs. Marris, Cr. and Ph. 351.
' Brett vs. Marsh, 1 Vern. 468; Young vs. English, 7 Beav. 10. Newmarsh vs.
Clay, 14 East, 239, was decided upon a similar pripciple,
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except to debts owing to him at the time he received it. The only
authority for the latter part of this rule appears to be the case -of
ifammersly vs. Knowlys, 2 Esp. 666. The case, as reported, is
not very clear; it seems, however, to have been one of
banker and
customer, and that the latter, being indebted to the former, made a
general payment on account, and then became further indebted.
The banker, upon the subsequent insolvency of the customer, sued
a third person upon accommodation acceptances, which had been
given to the banker as a security for the first contracted debt ; the
defendant insisted that that debt had been paid, whilst the banker
contended that he had a right to appropriate the payment, which
had been made generally, to the discharge of the subsequently contracted debt. This, however, Lord Kenyon would not allow, on
the ground that it would be too much to say that a payment made
generally was not a payment, but a deposit.' Upon a similar principle, a payment made generally was held to be applicable only
to
a debt ascertained in amount, and not -to a debt the amount of
which was wholly uncertain, and could only be determined by taking
a partnership .account.2 Both these cases are founded upon the
rule that money received by a debtor from his creditor is primd
facie a payment in the proper sense of that word.
Here it may .be as well to direct attention to a distinction between
the appropriation of a payment and the appropriation of a security
or its proceeds. It has just been seen that the creditor cannot convert a payment of an existing debt into a security for a future debt,
and cannot therefore appropriate a payment, although made generally, to a debt contracted after the payment was made. But it
has been held that, on the bankruptcy of a debtor, his creditor can
apply any general securities in his hands, or the proceeds of such
securities, in whatever manner best suits his own purpose, and even
to claims which have arisen after the securities were given. This
doctrine was settled by Lord Eldon, in ex parte .Hunter, 6 Yes.
94 ;3 and was acted upon in the late case of ex varte Johnson, 8 De
I

It must not be concealed that there was here only a single current account, in
which the debt in dispute appeared as an early item.
2 Goddart vs. Hodges, 1 Cr. & AL 33.

3 See, too, 1 Cooke's Baukr. Laws, 4th ed. 120.
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G. Me.& G. 218.) It often enables a creditor to avail himself. of
a security, by applying it to an unliquidated claim which he could
not prove against the bankrupt's estate, and then to prove for a
debt, without setting off against it the value of the security. The
principle of the cases just cited seems to be satisfactory. On the
one hand, the creditor has several claims against the bankrupt;
and, on the other hand, the latter has a claim against the creditor
in respect of the securities held by him. These cross-claims more
or less neutralize each other; the difference between the value of
the securities held by the creditor, and the sums owing to him, determines which of the two parties is upon the whole the debtor of
the other; and until the balance is struck, i. e. until the creditor
has been allowed to set off all his claims against the value of his
securities, he cannot be said to be indebted to the baiikrupt's estate.
The doctrine arises from the application of the liberal principle,
"Che who will have equity must do equity," and from the non-application in bankruptcy of the absurdly strict legal rules concerning
set-off. The above reasoning is obviously inapplicable to cases of
appropriation of payIments, inasmuch as a payment is in discharge
of an obligation on the part of the debtor, and gives him no claim
against the creditor ; cross-claims do not, in fact, arise.
4. Where a person is indebted in two capacities, e. g. on his own
account and also as the representative of another, a general payment is, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, inferred to
have been made in discharge of the liabilities incurred by the payer
himself, and the creditor is not therefore at liberty to appropriate
such a payment to the discharge of a liability of the other class.
This wa settled by the case of Goddart vs. Uoz, 2 Str. 1194.
There the debtor was liable-1. For a debt contracted by himself;
2. For a debt contracted by his wife, dum sola; 3. For a.debt
owing by her as executrix. C. J. Lee held that the defendant
having paid money to the plaintiff generally on account, the plaintiff was entitled to ascribe such payments either to the first or the
second debt, but not to the third. Of course, circumstances may
exist which show that the payment was not made in discharge of
the private liability of the payer. Thus, in T1ompson vs. Brown,
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Moo. & M. 40, a payment made with partnership money to a person
who was a creditor both of the firm and of the individual partner
making the payment, was naturally imputed to a partnership debt.
So in Bowes vs. Lucas, Andr. 55, a general payment of rent by a
person owing rent as executor and also as assignee, was held to have
been -made by him as executor ; the form of the receipts warranting
such an infereAce.1
5. Another and most important instance of inferred appropriation by the debtor is afforded by those cases where there is only one
single open current account between the debtor and his creditor.
In such cases, a payment made generally on account, is, in the
absence of evidence to the contrary,-' deemed to be made in satisfaction of the earliest items in the account ; and the creditor is consequently not allowed to make any other appropriation, unless he
can show some special reason justifying him in so doing. This
doctrine was firmly established by, Sir William Grant in Clayton's
case, 1 Mer. 585, which is the leading authority upon the point, and
the judgment in which deserves a most careful perusal. Bodenham
vs. Pure/as, 2 B. & A. 39, and many other cases, have since been
decided upon the same principle. 3 In Williams vs. Rawlinson, 3
Bing. 71, the doctrine in question was held to apply even to the
prejudice of the debtor's surety, who in vain contended that a
general payment ought to be appropriated to the debt which le had
guaranteed ; and in the late important case of Pennell vs. Deffell,
4 De G. Me. and G. 372, the rule was further adhered to, although
persons for whom the debtor was trustee were thereby deprived of
a considerable sum of money. In Pennell vs. Deffell, cestuis que
trustent attempted to follow their money into the hands of the
bankers of their trustee : the money was traced to the bankers, was
found on the credit side of the trustee's account at the bank, and
was held, according to the rule in Clayton's case, to have disappeared
so far, but so far only, as the payments out by the banker had
diminished it after having exhausted all the sums previously paid
in. The L. J. Turner, in his judgment says,-" I take it to be
ASee, too, Sternedale vs. Hankinson, 1 Sim. 393.
3 See the Synopsis of cases, Yost.
4 B. & Ad. 466-467, and see post.
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now well settled, that moneys drawn out on a banking account are
to be applied to the earlier items on the opposite side of the account.
By every payment which he makes, the banker discharges so much
of the debt which he-first contracted. If that debt arose from
trust-moneys paid in by the customer, so much of those trustmoneys is paid off, and unless otherwise invested on account of the
trust, falls into the customer's general estate, and is lost to the
trust, because it cannot be distinguished from the general estate of
which it has become part. If,on the other hand, the earliest debt
due from the banker arose from the customer's own moneys paid in
by him, that debt is pro tanto discharged, and the trust-moneys subsequently paid in remain unaffected. The same principle runs
through the whole account: each sum drawn out goes to discharge
the earliest debt due from the banker which is remaining unpaid;
and thus, when it is ascertained what moneys have been paid in
belonging to the trust, it becomes clear to what portion of the
balance which remains the trust estate is entitled."
The rule in Clayton's case, it will be observed, obtains only upon
the supposition that there is no evidence from the usual course of
business or otherwise, to show in discharge of what partichlar item a
payment was made. The rule is by no means one which, like a
presumtiojuris et de jure, is applied rigorously and independently
of intention.' In the following cases, although there was a single
open current account, there was evidence to show in respect of what
in particular a general payment was made, and the rule in Clayton's
case was consequently not applied. See Stoveld vs. BEade, 4 Bing.
154; Taylor vs. KAmer, 3 B. & Ad. 320; Lysaght vs. Walker,
5 Bli. N. S. 1.
In applying the rule in Clayton's case, the right of a creditor to
refuse a partial payment must not be forgotten. If the creditor
accepts a partial payment without dissent, he is, as already observed,
bound to apply it for the purpose for which it is paid, and-whether
that purpose be expressed or implied, is immaterial. If,then, there
be a single current account between a debtor and his creditor, and
a general partial payment be made and accepted without objection,
See 4 B. & Ad. 766-767, Wilson vs. Ilirst.
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the rule in Clayton's 'ease applies, and the creditor cannot afterwards make a different appropriation. But if the creditor refuses
to accept a partial payment unless it be applied to the liquidation
of some particular debt, and if,
after such a refusal, the money is
left with him, the. inference would be that the debtor acquiesced in
making the payment on the account desired, and Clayton's case
would not apply. These remarks appeared necessary in order to
reconcile the observations of Lord Lyndhurst, in Pemberton vs.
Oakes, 4 Russ. 154, and of Tindal, C. J., in Smith vs. Wigler, 3
Moore & Scott, 175, with the view above taken of Clayton's case.
Both those learned judges observe that the rule laid down by Sir
William Grant only applies if there has been no express appropriation by the debtor or the creditor; and as we have already seen that
the creditor is not bound to make an appropriation within any fixed
time, it might have been thought the rule in Clayton's case would
scarcely ever be applicable, or that, being founded on an appropriation by the debtor, it ought to obtain in spite of the creditor.
Clayton's case and the rule established by it depend, however, upon
a presumption: "presumably it is the first sum paid in that is the
first drawn out ;" in other words, a payment in respect of one entire
current account is inferred to have been made by the debtor in
liquidation of the earliest items to his debit. But this inference
would be rebutted, and the rule would not therefore apply, if at the
time when a partial payment was made, the creditor insisted on
having it applied to some item in particular.
Such cases as Pease vs. Hirst, 10 J, & C. 122, and Henniker vs.
Wigg, 4 Q. B. 793, although sometimes referred to as instances
where the rule in Clayton's case has not been applied, in truth illustrate a different branch of the law. In each of these two cases the
question was, whether a certain security was or not at an end, as it
would have been by the rule in Clayton's case, if it had been given
in respect of the earliest of several debts. The Court held that
the securities were given not for any debt in particular, but generally as continuing securities for any balance which might be due,
and that therefore Clayton's case did not apply so as to extinguish
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the securities. These decisions are evidently foreign to the matter
in hand.
6. The last class of cases in which a general payment is inferred
to have been made on account of some particular debt, consists of
those where a debtor, being in insolvent circumstances, his assignees or trustees make a payment of so much in the pound to every
creditor. If a creditor has several demands and receives so much
in the pound upon the tetal amount of his claims, what he receives
is considered as paid as much in respect of one debt as of another,
and he therefore cannot appropriate the dividend received, to the
satisfaction of one debt more than of another, but must apply the
whole dividend to all the debts pro ratd.1 Consequently, also, if
one of the debts is secured by a surety, the surety cannot insist upon
the whole dividend being applied by the creditor in satisfaction of
that debt, nor can the creditor apply the whole dividend to an unsecured debt; the dividend must be apportioned ratably between
the two, and the surety is answerable, and answerable only for the
amount of the debt guaranteed less the dividend paid in respect of
it.' The same rule of appropriation _pro ratW applies of course
where, in the absence of insolvency, it can be gathered from the
conduct of the parties that a general payment was intended as a
payment on account of each debt. Such was the case of .Perri
vs. Roberts, 1 Vern. 34, aliter, Bevis vs. Roberts, 2 Ch. Ca. 83,
where two debts had been cast into one account, and a bill of sale
given in respect of the amount of both had been realized by the
creditor. The Master of the Rolls and the Lord Chancellor both,
held that a surety for one of the debts was entitled to have the proceeds of the bill of sale applied ratably to both, and that the
creditor had no right as against the surety, to apply the whole proceeds to the discharge of the debt for which he was not responsible.
We may, perhaps, be allowed to express a doubt whether the
conclusion in this case would not have been different if it had
occurred a century or so later. The case furnishes another
I See Bardwell vs. Lydall, 7 Bing. 489; Raikes vs. Todd, 8 A. & E. 846.
arrears of interest are to be discharged before any part of the principal.

Marris, Cr. & Ph. 351.
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But

Bower vs.
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example of the influence of the Roman law at the period of the
decision.
Secondly.-The extensive right of appropriation which the law
confers upon creditors, presupposes the existence of more than one
valid debt. We have already seen that the creditor may appropriate a general payment to a debt .barred by time; but the statute
of James, upon which the cases deciding this doctrine turned has
often been declared only to bar the remedy by action or suit, and
not to extinguish the right to payment, if there be any other mode
of enforcing it. Where, however, one of the so called debts has
no juridical existence, where it imposes no obligation on the debtor,
and donsequently confers no right on the creditor, there the creditor
cannot be allowed to apply a general payment to its liquidation;'
to allow him. to do so would be at the same time to admit and deny
the existence of one and the same right.
. Upon this principle, accordingly, it was held in Wright vs. Laing,
3 B. & 0. 165, that the creditor could not appropriate a general
p~yment to the liquidation of a claim invalid on the ground of
usury. So in Lampbell vs. Billereay Union, 3 Exch. 883, it was
held that a creditor could not appropriate a general payment to the
liquidation of a demand arising from work ,done for a corporation,
but for which work the corporation could not be called upon to pay,
there having been no contract under the corporate seal.' These
cases have been supposed irreconcilable with Philpott vs. Jones, 2
A. & E. 41. There, a publican was allowed to appropriate a
general payment to the liquidation of a debt owing for spirits sold
in smaller quantities than those for which a person is allowed by the
Tippling Act to sue. But the Tippling Act merely says, that no
person 8hall sue for or recover, either in law or equity, any debt for

spirituous liquors, unless the debt is contracted at one time to the
amount of twenty shillings or upwards. In this respect the Tippling
Act resembles the statute of James for the limitation of actions and
suits; both statutes deprive a creditor of active judicial assistance,
'IEparte Randleson, 2 Deac. & Ch. 634.
2 This case is, however, directly opposed to Arnold vs. Poole, 4 Man. & Gr. 860,

and is one of the many disgraceful modern cases in which corporations have been
allowed to take advantage of their own wrong.

THE APPROPRIATION OF PAYMENTS.

but both allow him to assist himself if he can.
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Philpotts vs. Jones

is clearly, therefore, not an authority for the statement that a
person can appropriate to the satisfaction of a juridically nonexisting debt, money which has been paid him generally on account.
Crookshank vs. Bose, 5 Car. & P. '19, is another case on the
Tippling Act, and is equally open to the above remarks.
As, until recently, an equitable obligation was not recognized at
law, it was held in Birch vs. Tebbutt, 2 Stark. N. P.- 74, and by
Bayley, B., in Goddart vs. Bfodges, 1 Cr. &M. 33, that a creditor
could not be permitted by a Court of law to apply a general payment to the liquidation of a demand purely equitable. Even
admitting that these cases-were decided by a strictly logical application of the rule in question, the decisions may be regretted as
adding to the number of cases in which law and equity conflict.
Now, however, that equitable rights and obligations are not ignored
at law, a different doctrine will no doubt be established. Bosanquet
vs. TJrrayq, 6 Taunt. 597, which is sometimes thought opposed to the
last two cases, fell within the rule of Clayton's-ease, as the equitable
debts formed the earliest items of what the Court held to be a single
current account. The marginal note by Taunton has probably led
to the opinion noticed, and is certainly calculated to mislead.
James vs. Child, 2 Or. & J. 678, although not falling strictly
within the principle now under discussion, seems to be more closely
allied to the cases just referred to than to any others. There the
Court held that a solicitor having an open unsettled account with
his client, had no right to make two bills, putting all the taxable
items in one, and all the non-taxable items in the other, and then.
to apply a general payment to the liquidation of the first bill in
order to sue solely on the second. The client had a right. to have
all the items in one bill, and to refer the whole for taxation.
Thirdly.-The general right of the creditor, which has been
examined, is a right to appropriate a payment which the debtor
might have appropriated if he had thought proper, but which he
did not, in fact, either expressly or impliedly, or by presumption,
pay on any account in particular. The creditor's right does not
arise unless the debtor had an opportunity toexercise his right;
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and, consequently, in Waller vs. Lacy, 2 Man. & Gr. 54, the Court
would not suffer an attorney to appropriate in part satisfaction of
his bill a sum of 171. which' he had received from a debtor of the
defendant, but without his knowledge. Tindal, C. J., there said,
"It is not disputed that as regards a payment where the party paying does not appropriate the money, the party receiving it may;
for it is the fault of the payer if he omit to exercise the right of
appropriation of the sum so paid. But this is not the case of a
payment at all, but of a sum of money received without the knowlege of the defendant. Therefore, as the latter never had the
power of exercising any election as to the application of this sum,
the right of the plaintiff to appropriate it never arose." Upon a
similar principle it is held, that the produce of a security must be
applied to liquidate the dates for which that security was expressly
given, and no others,' and they must be liquidated according to
their priority; the produce of the security being, in fact, treated as
the security itself.2
Having now passed in review all the cases of any importance
relating to the appropriation of payments as defined at the beginning of this inquiry, it may be useful concisely to recapitulate the
I
principal rules deducible therefrom.
Using the word debt to denote a sum of money owing by one
person to another, and the amount of which is either ascertained or
ascertainable by mere computation; and using the word payment
to denote the transfer of a sum of money by a debtor to his creditor,
in complete or partial satisfaction of the latter's claims against
him; it appears that by the law of this country:
1. A debtor may pay in full whichever of several debts he likes;
and if, when he makes a payment in full, he states on account of
what -debt he makes it, the payment can be applied to that debt
and no other.
2. A creditor has a right to insist upon applying a partial payment to any debt he pleases; but if, when the' partial payment is
I Subject to the doctrine of tacking.
2 Brett v. Marsh, 1 Vern. 468; and see Greenwood vs. Taylor, 14 Sun. 505;
Young vs. English, 7 Bear. 10.
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made, he accepts it without objection, the payment must be applied
to that debt on account of which the debtor made it.
3. A payment which is not, when made, appropriated to any
debt in particular, may at any time be applied by the creditor to
any debt existing at the time of payment; and no appropriation
by him is considered final until communicated to the debtor.
4. In the absence of sufficient reason to the contrary, a payment
is inferred to have been, and is to be treated as, having been appropriated, when made, to the discharge, in the first instance,Of the debt for which the debtor is responsible in his own private
capacity;
Of a debt then due, rather than of an unascertained sum claimed
by the creditor, or of a debt not then payable;
Of a debt upon which the debtor might then have been made
bankrupt;
Of the then arrears of interest;
Of the earliest of several items which together form one entire
account;
Of all debts pro ratawhen the payment is a dividend of so much
in the pound.
Further, it may be gathered from the decided cases, that the right
of the creditor is a right which, if it arises at all, is wholly independent of the will of the debtor, and cannot be considered as a
permission or license granted by him; for if it were, it would lead
to the absurdity of inferring a tacit license to do that which is
most disadvantageous to the person supposed to grant it, and would
further lead to a doctrine which is clearly not law,' viz: that an
appropriation by the creditor of a general payment would be sufficient to take the debt to which the appropriation is made, out of
the Statute of Limitations. Nor do the cases warrant the notion
that, under certain circumstances, the law appropriates a general
payment to one debt rather than another; and still less is it true,
that the law appropriates such a payment in the way most beneficial
to the debtor, or according to the justice and equity of the case.
The law, in this country, it is submitted, makes no appropriation
' Nash vs. Hodgson, Kay, 650.
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whatever, and the appropriations said to be made by it are neither
more nor less than the appropriations made by the debtor, and
evidenced, not indeed by his express words, but by circumstances
which leave but little doubt as to what his intention really was.
Nors.-The following SywoPsis O CASES relative to the appropriation of payments, is submitted as likely to prove useful to the practitioner, and as affording
means for attesting the accuracy of some of the propositions and suggestions contained in the foregoing pages:

I.-RIGHT OF THE DEBTORTo appropriatein the first instance.
Anon., Cro. EL 68; Bois vs. Cranfield, Style, 239; Chase vs. Box, Freem.
261.
To appropriateat the time of payment, but not afterwards.
Manning vs. Westerne, 2 Vern. 606; Wilkinson vs. Sterne, 9 Mod. 427;
Bowes vs. Lucas, Andr. 55; Hall vs. Wood, 14 East, 243, note c.; Peters
vs. Anderson, 5 Taunt. 596; Mayfield vs. Wadsley, 3 B. & C. 857.
I.-RIGHT OF THE CREDITORTo appropriatea generalpayment.
Manning vs. Westerns, 2 Vern. 607; Hall vs. Wood, 14 East, 243, note c.
Peters vs. Anderson, 5 Taunt. 596; Campbell vs. Hodgson, Gow, 74;
Morgan vs. Jones, 1 Bro. Parl. Ca. 32.
To appropriateat any time he likes.
Peters vs. Anderson, 5 Taunt. 596; Philpotts vs. Jones, 2 A. & E. 41;
Mills vs. Fowkes, 5 Bing N. C. 455.
To change his mind as often as he likes, until the appropriationis communicated to the debtor.
Simson'vs. Ingham, 2 B. & C. 65; Grigg vs. Cocks, 4 Sim. 438.
see ExparteJohnson, 3 De G. Me. & G. 218.]

[And

And to appropriateto any debt he pleases, e. g.
1. To a debt, payment of which cannot be actively enforced, because
ofThe Statutes of Limitations.
Mills vs. Fowkes, 5 Bing. N. C. 455; Williams vs. Griffiths, 5 M. & W.
300; Nash vs. Hodgson, Kay, 650.
The Stamp Act.
Biggs vs Dwight, 1 Man. & Ry. 308.
The Tippling Act.
Philpotts vs. Jones, 2 A. & E. 41; Crookshanks vs. Rose, 5 C. & P. 19
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2. To a simple contract rather than to a specialty debt.
Peters vs. Anderson, 5 Taunt. 596; Chitty vs. Naish, 2 Dowl. 511; Chase
vs. Cox, Freem. 261; Brazier vs. Bryant, 2 Dowl. 477. [But see Via. Ab.
Paym. M. 9.4

3. To a new rather than an old debt.
Peters vs. Anderson, 5 Taunt. 596; Chitty vs. Naish, 2 DowL 511
[But see Wentworth vs. Manning, 2 Eq. Ab. 261.]

4. To a debt not guaranteed, rather than to one which is.
z parte Whitworth, 2 Mont. Deac. & De G. 164; Kirby vs. Duke of
Marlborough, 2 M. & S. 18; Plomer vs. Long, 1 Stark, N. P. 155.

5. To a debt not bearing interest, rather than to one which does.
Chase vs. Cox, Freem. 261; Manning vs. Westerne, 2 Vern. 606;
[Heyward vs. Lomax, 1 Vern. 23, contra.]

Provided it be a debt of which the law can take notice.
Exparte Randleson, 2 Deac. & Ch. 534; Wright vs. Laing, 3 B. & C.
165; Lampbell vs. Billaricay Union, 3 Exch. 283.

[As to Equitable debts, see
Birch vs. Tebbutt, 2 Stark. N. P. 74;_Goddart vs. Hodges, 1 Cr. & M.
33.]

And be existing at the time the payment is made.
Hammersley vs. Knowlys, 2 Esp. 666.

And be also then ascertainedin amount.
Goddart vs. Hodges, 1 Cr. & M. 33.
And provided the debtor had an opportunity of approtpriating.
Waller vs. Lacy, 2 Man. & Gr. 54; Brett vs. Marsh, 1 Vern. 468; Young
vs. English, 7 Beav. 10.
III.-OASES WHERE NO APPROPRIATION HAVING BEEN EXPRESSLY MADE
BY THE DEBTOR, AN APPROPRIATION BY HIM IS INFERRED, UNTIL SOME
REASON APPEARS TO THE CONTRARY.
Inferences drawn from the nature, of the debts, viz: of appropriation
to1. Debt on which the debtor could be made bankrupt.
Meggot vs. Wilson, 1 Ld. Raym. 286; Dawe vs. Holdsworth, Peake, N.
P. 64.
2. Arrears of Interest.
Vin. Ab. Paym. L 4; Haynes vs. Harrison, 1 Ch. Ca. 105; Chase vs.
Box, Freem. 261; Bostock vs. Bostock, 8 Mod. 242; O'Bierne vs. McMahon,
1 Jones, (Jr. Eq.) 442; Bower vs. Marris, Cr. & Ph. 351.
3. Existing debt.
Hammersley vs. Knowlys; 2 Esp. 666.
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4. Debt owing by the debtor in his own private capacity.
Goddart vs. Cox, 2 Str. 1194.
5. Earliest item of current account.
Clayton's ca. I Mer. 585; Bodenham vs. Parchas, 2 B. & A. 39 ; Simson
vs. Cook, 1 Bing. 452 ; Williams vs. Rawlinson, 3 Bing. 71 ; Field vs. Carr,
5 Bing. 13; Brooke vs. Enderby, 2 Bred. & Bing. 70; Pemberton vs.
Oakes, 4 Russ. 154; and compare Jones vs. Maund, 3 Y. & C. Ex. 154.
Copland vs. Toulmin, 7 CL & Fin. 349 ; Bank of Scotland vs. Christie, 8
Cl. & Fin. 227, 228; Smith vs. Wigler, 3 Moo. & So. 175; Manning vs.
Westerne, 2 Vern. 606; Euparte Randleson, 2 Deac. & Ch. 534; Sternedale vs. Hankinson, I Sim. 393; Pennell vs. Deffell, 8 De G. Mc. & G.
372.

Inferences drawnfrom the mode of panment or circumstances artending

it ; viz: from1. A payment pro ratd of so much in the pound.
Bardwell vs. Lydall, 7 Bing. 489 ; Martin vs. Brecknell, 2 M. & S. 39;
Raikes vs. Todd, 8 A. & E. 846; Paley vs. Field, 12 Ves. 435; Bower vs.
Marris, Cr. & Ph. 851 [as to interest.]

2. Pressure.
Shaw vs. Picton, 4 B. & C. 715.

3. Substitution for security (see, too, below, No. 7.)
Newmarsh vs. Clay, 14 East, 289.
4. Account stated.
Perris vs. Roberts, 2 Vern. 34.

5. Amount of payment and discount.
Marryatts vs. White, 2 Stark. N. P. 101.

6. Form of receipt.
I Bowes vs. Lucas, Andr. 55; Frazer vs. Birch, 3 Knapp, 380.

7. Source of money.
Brett vs. Marsh, I Vern. 468; Thompson vs. Brown, Moo. & M. 40;
Stoveld vs. Eade, 4 Bing. 154; Young vs. English, 7 Bear. 10; Greenwood
vs. Taylor, 14 Sim. 505.

8. Course of business.
Brown vs. Anderson, 2 Moo. Priv. Counc. 245; Taylor vs. Kymer, 3 B.
& Ad. 820; Lysaght vs. Walker, 5 BIL N. S. 1.

